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EXTENDING TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OUTSIDE 
OF INDIAN COUNTRY: KELSEY V. POPE 
Greg S. Keogh* 
I. Introduction 
The inherent sovereignty of American Indian tribes, such as the Little 
River Band of Ottawa Indians, was recognized long before the founding of 
the United States. In fact, Indian tribal governments are some of the earliest 
governments in the world.1 However, the powers and authorities 
intertwined with inherent sovereignty are neither established nor protected 
by the United States Constitution.2 Although the structure and 
responsibilities of tribal governments varied from tribe to tribe, most tribes 
used some form of authoritative body to facilitate societal control.3 These 
governing bodies held tribal members to a certain standard of individual 
behavior and self-control within the society. Members that did not live up 
to these standards and tribal norms were punished. Depending on the extent 
of the deviation, punishments included, but were not limited to, ordering the 
violator to make a payment to the injured member, banishing the violator, 
and, in extreme cases, sentencing the violator to death.4 In short, Indian 
tribes have possessed and exercised the power to maintain social order over 
their members for well over two hundred years.5  
This Note will explore the inherent sovereign powers retained by Indian 
tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members. In particular, 
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Tribal Sovereignty: History and the Law, NATIVE AM. CAUCUS OF THE CAL. 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, http://www.nativeamericancaucus.org/resources/tribal-sovereignty-
history-and-the-law (last visited Oct. 19, 2018). 
 2. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 
F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 168 
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 3. See, e.g., RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN 
TO COURT (1975). 
 4. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01(1)(a), at 206 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., Supp. 2017) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (citing RAYMOND D. 
AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-
GOVERNANCE (2009); SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1994); 
KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941); D’ARCY 
MCNICKLE, THEY CAME HERE FIRST 52-65 (Harper & Row, rev. ed. 1975) (1949)). 
 5. Tribal Sovereignty: History and the Law, supra note 1. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
224 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
 
 
this Note will analyze and compare the competing theories of membership-
based jurisdiction and territory-based jurisdiction, as well as the extent to 
which Congress or treaties have limited jurisdictional powers. Furthermore, 
this Note will discuss the significance of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Kelsey v. Pope.6 
II. The Contours of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
Although Indian tribes no longer possess the same freedom to prescribe 
laws for their members and punishments for violators, they do retain unique 
and limited powers of sovereignty. The United States has long recognized 
Indian tribes as “separate people[s], with the power of regulating their 
internal and social relations . . . .”7 These powers are not granted from the 
United States to Indian tribes, but are inherent powers tribes have retained 
since long before the arrival of any European nation.8 However, tribes’ 
“incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their acceptance 
of its protection, necessarily divested them of some aspects of the 
sovereignty which they had previously exercised.”9 This dependent 
relationship meant that tribal sovereignty, in a practical sense, hinged upon 
recognition by the United States government and could be limited by 
treaties and congressional enactments.  
One such impediment on tribal sovereignty includes Congress’s ability 
to wield their “plenary and exclusive” power to limit tribal authority.10 By 
creating laws and limiting tribal powers, the United States has exerted 
control over Indian Country11 and all members within its boundaries. While 
a tribe’s presence within the territorial boundaries of the United States 
divests it of certain powers of sovereignty, including the power to enter into 
treaties with foreign nations, there are few limitations on internal tribal 
sovereignty.12 Therefore, Indian tribes retain all sovereign powers to self-
govern and facilitate social control, so long as those powers have not been 
                                                                                                                 
 6. 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Kelsey v. Bailey, 137 S. Ct. 183 
(2016). 
 7. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). 
 8. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). 
 9. Id. at 323.  
 10. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) (citing United 
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004)). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (“[A]ll land within the limits of any Indian reservation 
under the jurisdiction of the United States Government . . . .”). 
 12. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 4.02(1), at 222. 
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expressly limited by statute, treaty, or implicit divestment by virtue of the 
tribe’s domestic dependent status.13  
An inherent sovereign power retained by tribes is the authority to 
exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over certain minor crimes 
committed by an Indian in Indian Country.14 Over the years, Congress has 
enacted several provisions of the federal criminal code to limit tribes’ 
inherent sovereign power to exercise tribal criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
Country. The General Crimes Act (GCA)15 and the Major Crimes Act 
(MCA)16 are two of the most significant additions to the federal criminal 
code.  
The GCA provides that “the general laws of the United States as to the 
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall extend to the Indian 
country,” but not if the offense is “committed by one Indian against . . . 
another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian 
country.”17 These “general laws” are “criminal statutes enacted by Congress 
to govern admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” and to protect important 
federal properties, including “post offices, national parks, and military 
installations.”18  
The MCA dictates that a tribal member who commits any felony listed in 
the statute against any person within Indian Country shall be subject to the 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the federal government.19 Unlike the 
GCA, the MCA applies even if both the defendant and the victim are tribal 
members.20 Therefore, minor offenses committed by one tribal member 
against another within Indian Country remain within a tribal government’s 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction.  
Until recently, it was widely assumed that any offense committed by one 
tribal member against another outside of Indian Country, regardless of 
severity, fell under the criminal jurisdiction of either the state or federal 
government. For example, in Roe v. Doe,21 Jane Roe, a member of the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. at 223. 
 14. Id. § 9.04, at 765-69. 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). 
 17. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
 18. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 9.02(1)(c)(i), at 740 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 7 
(2012)). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 649 N.W.2d 566 (N.D. 2002). 
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Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, brought suit against John Doe, a member of the 
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, in an attempt to 
establish that Doe was the father of Roe’s child.22 After the trial court ruled 
against Doe, he moved to vacate the judgment for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Doe asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction because both Roe and Doe were tribal members, and both 
parties and the child were legal residents within Indian Country at the time 
of the suit.23 After the trial court denied his motion, Doe appealed to the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota. Examining the circumstances in which the 
United States Supreme Court has upheld tribal courts’ exclusive civil 
jurisdiction, the court found that pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 
tribal courts possess “exclusive jurisdiction ‘over any child custody 
proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the 
reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested 
in the State by existing Federal law.’”24 Thereafter, the court noted that 
although this case concerned tribal civil jurisdiction, “an Indian tribe has 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against 
Indians in Indian country unless such crimes fall within the Major Crimes 
Act . . . . However, outside of Indian country, the state has general criminal 
jurisdiction over all persons, including Indians.”25 After finding “the record 
indicate[d] that all the events leading up to the action occurred off [the 
reservation],” the court reaffirmed the notion that, “[a]bsent express federal 
law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have 
generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise 
applicable to all citizens of the State.”26 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota affirmed the trial court’s denial of Doe’s motion to vacate the 
trial court’s judgment.27  
In Kelsey v. Pope, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit took a different stance by endorsing the notion that Indian 
tribes have retained the inherent sovereign authority to exercise 
membership-based criminal jurisdiction independent of territorial 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. at 567-68. 
 23. Id. at 567-68. 
 24. Id. at 569 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)). 
 25. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Id. at 579-80 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 
(1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. Id. at 580. 
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jurisdiction, even when the parties are members of different tribes.28 The 
Sixth Circuit’s holding is an important stepping-stone towards greater 
freedom and lesser restraint on Indian tribes’ ability to exercise their 
inherent sovereign powers, as it is the first federal judicial decision to 
recognize a tribe’s power to extend criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian 
Country. 
III. Background of Kelsey v. Pope 
The historical background of Kelsey v. Pope helps address why the Sixth 
Circuit held that Indian tribes may have retained the inherent sovereign 
power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members for conduct 
occurring outside of Indian Country under certain limited conditions. 
Located in northwest Michigan, the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians 
(the “Band”) “is a federally recognized Indian tribe presently maintaining a 
government-to-government relationship with the United States.”29 Although 
this relationship and recognition has fluctuated over the years, the Band 
“became the first tribe ‘acknowledged’ by the Secretary of the Interior 
pursuant to the federal acknowledgment process . . . .”30 Due to this 
recognition and incorporation within the territorial boundaries of the United 
States, the Band was divested of several aspects of the inherent sovereign 
powers it once possessed.31  
Importantly, however, the Band retains “the inherent authority to 
establish [its] own form of government, including tribal justice systems.”32 
Exerting these retained sovereign powers, the Band enacted a tribal 
constitution and established judicial independence.33 Under this constitution 
and the powers vested within, the Band’s tribal courts have the power “[t]o 
adjudicate all civil and criminal matters arising within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribe or to which the Tribe or an enrolled member of the Tribe is a party.”34 
However, the issue of whether the Band retained the authority to extend 
criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian Country—under a membership-based 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 860 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 
676, 686 (1990)). 
 29. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Office of U.S. Attorney for 
W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 961 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 30. Id. at 962; see 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.20-83.46. 
 31. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). 
 32. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(4). 
 33. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS CONST. art. VI, § 9. 
 34. Id. art. VI, § 8. 
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jurisdictional approach rather than a territory-based jurisdictional 
approach—remained unanswered until recently.  
IV. Kelsey v. Pope 
Norbert Kelsey, an elected member of the Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians’ nine-person tribal council, was charged with misdemeanor sexual 
assault and harassment in the Little River Tribal Court for inappropriate 
actions toward Heidi Foster.35 “Foster [was] an employee of the Band’s 
medical clinic and a member of a neighboring tribe.”36 The incident 
occurred on July 5, 2005, during a meeting of the tribal elders at the Band’s 
Community Center, located outside of Indian Country.37 Almost three years 
later, the tribal court held that “[s]ince Defendant [was] a tribal member, his 
victim [was] a Native American, and the site of his crime was a facility 
owned by the Tribe, [the] case was clearly within the territorial and subject 
matter jurisdiction of [the] court.”38 The Little River Tribal Court convicted 
Kelsey and sentenced him to six months in jail.39  
Kelsey appealed the tribal court’s judgment to the Little River Court of 
Appeals, arguing the Band lacked the authority to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over his conduct because the incident occurred outside of the 
Band’s territory.40 Kelsey also asserted that section 4.03 of the Band’s 
Criminal Offenses Ordinance precludes criminal jurisdiction over tribal 
members for conduct outside of Indian Country.41 Under section 4.03(a), 
criminal jurisdiction extends to “[1] all land within the limits of the Tribe's 
reservation . . . [,] [2] [land] held in trust by the United States . . . [,] and [3] 
land considered ‘Indian country.’”42 Moreover, section 4.03(b) grants tribal 
courts the authority to extend criminal jurisdiction over members, no matter 
where the offense was committed, if the member committed any one of 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians v. Kelsey, No. 07103TM, 2008 WL 6928233, 
at *1 (Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Ct. Aug. 21, 2008). Kelsey was charged 
under LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCE 03-400-03, § 4.03(b) (2010). 
 36. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, No. 07103TM, at *2.  
 39. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 853.  
 40. Id. at 852. 
 41. Id. at 853. 
 42. Id. at 864 (quoting LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCE 03-400-03, 
§ 4.03(a) (2010)). 
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nine enumerated offenses.43 Sexual assault is not among these offenses.44 
Although Kelsey’s conduct did not fall within any of the provisions of 
section 4.03, the tribal court of appeals found this section inconsistent with 
the authority granted in the Band’s constitution45 and section 8.08 of the 
Criminal Procedure Ordinance.46 Section 4.03 was deemed 
“‘unconstitutionally narrow in that it [did] not provide for the exercise of 
inherent criminal jurisdiction over all tribal lands.’”47 Thus, the tribal court 
of appeals removed the incongruous territorial limitation and affirmed the 
jurisdictional reach of the Band.48  
Kelsey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Western District 
of Michigan, arguing that (1) the Band lacked inherent sovereign authority 
to extend criminal jurisdiction over his off-reservation conduct, and (2) the 
retroactive application of the criminal laws by the tribal court of appeals 
violated his due process protections under the Indian Civil Rights Act.49 A 
magistrate judge examined Kelsey’s appeal and found that “the Tribe 
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute Kelsey because the alleged crime occurred 
outside Indian country,” as well as “that the Tribe's attempt to retroactively 
expand its jurisdiction to encompass crimes that occurred outside Indian 
country, if effective, would have violated Kelsey's due process rights.”50 
The district court, while agreeing with the magistrate judge’s conclusion 
that the Band lacked the authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
Kelsey because the incident occurred outside of Indian Country, refused to 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. (citing LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, Ordinance 03-400-03, § 4.03(b) 
(2010)). 
 44. Id.  
 45. “The Tribe's jurisdiction over its members and territory shall be exercised to the 
fullest extent consistent with this Constitution, the sovereign powers of the Tribe, and federal 
law.” LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS CONST. art. I, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 46. “The Tribal Court shall have jurisdiction over any action by any Indian as defined 
by this Ordinance, that is made a criminal offense under applicable Tribal Code and that 
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribe . . . .” LITTLE RIVER BAND OF 
OTTAWA INDIANS, ORDINANCE 03-300-03, § 8.08 (2003), quoted in Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 865. 
This provision was reworded in 2011. See LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS, 
ORDINANCE 03-300-03, § 8.08 (2011), http://lrboi-nsn.gov/images/docs/council/ 
docs/ordinances/Title%20300-03.pdf. 
 47. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 865 (quoting Transcript of Record at 9, Little River Band of 
Ottawa Indians v. Kelsey, 8 Am. Tribal Law 283 (Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal 
Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2009)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 854; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2012). 
 50. Kelsey v. Pope, No. 1:09-CV-1015, 2014 WL 1338170, at *1 (W.D. Mich. 2014). 
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address the due process issue.51 “Accordingly, the district court granted 
habeas relief for lack of tribal jurisdiction.”52 The Band then appealed the 
district court’s judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. 
The issues brought before the Sixth Circuit were: (1) whether the Band 
lacked criminal jurisdiction over Kelsey’s off-reservation conduct, and (2) 
whether the judgment by the tribal court of appeals violated Kelsey’s due 
process protections established under the Indian Civil Rights Act.53 
However, to answer these issues, the Sixth Circuit first had to address the 
broader issue of whether a tribal court’s criminal jurisdiction is territory-
based or membership-based. 
V. Decision of the Case 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the 
Western District Court of Michigan’s finding that tribal criminal 
jurisdiction was lacking and vacated the lower court’s grant of habeas 
corpus relief.54 The Sixth Circuit held that the Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians properly asserted criminal jurisdiction over Kelsey, even though his 
conduct occurred outside of Indian Country.55 To reach this decision, the 
Court broke down the governing framework into three separate inquiries: 
“(1) [D]o Indian tribes have inherent sovereign authority to exercise extra-
territorial criminal jurisdiction? (2) If so, has that authority been expressly 
limited by Congress or treaty? And (3) if not, have the tribes been implicitly 
divested of that authority by virtue of their domestic dependent status?”56 
A. “Do Indian Tribes Have Inherent Sovereign Authority to Exercise Extra-
Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction?” 
The Sixth Circuit first addressed the Tribe’s inherent sovereign authority 
as it relates to extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction. As discussed above, the 
ability to prescribe laws for tribal members and to punish violators who 
break said laws is an inherent sovereign power retained by Indian tribes.57 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 854. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8). 
 54. Id. at 852. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 855. 
 57. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014); United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 
381-82 (1886). 
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However, the issue involved in Kelsey was not simply whether a tribe may 
exert criminal jurisdiction over a member, but whether this inherent 
authority extends outside of Indian Country.58 Kelsey argued that the power 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction is governed by “the twin factors of tribal 
membership and territory . . . .”59 When either factor is missing from the 
equation, the Tribe’s authority is nearly, if not completely, non-existent.60 
Arguing against this notion, the Band contended that tribes maintain the 
“‘inherent authority to prosecute tribal members for offenses substantially 
affecting tribal self-governance interests,’ even when such offenses take 
place outside of Indian country.”61 In order to decide the more persuasive 
argument, the Sixth Circuit examined Supreme Court62 and Ninth Circuit 
precedent.63 Agreeing with the Band, the court found that “[t]he two most 
helpful cases in establishing membership as the driving force behind 
criminal jurisdiction are Wheeler . . . and Duro . . . .”64  
In United States v. Wheeler, a Navajo tribal member convicted in tribal 
court for contributing to the delinquency of a minor was subsequently 
indicted in federal court for statutory rape.65 In that case, the Supreme Court 
held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution66 does not bar federal prosecution of a criminal who has 
already been punished in a tribal court.67 The Court reasoned that the grand 
jury’s indictment did not constitute double jeopardy because “the power to 
punish offenses against tribal law committed by [tribal] members, which 
was part of the Navajos' primeval sovereignty, has never been taken away 
from them, either explicitly or implicitly, and is attributable in no way to 
any delegation to them of federal authority.”68 Thus, when a tribe exercises 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 854-55. 
 59. Id. at 856. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 855-56. 
 62. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 
(2008); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); South Dakota v. Bourland, 
508 U.S. 679 (1993); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); United States v. Wheeler, 435 
U.S. 313 (1978). 
 63. See Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Sidney v. Zah, 718 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1983); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
 64. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 856 (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, and Duro, 495 U.S. 676).  
 65. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 313. 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).  
 67. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332. 
 68. Id. at 328. 
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criminal jurisdiction over a tribal member, “it does so as part of its retained 
sovereignty and not as an arm of the Federal Government.”69 Although the 
conduct at issue occurred within Indian Country, Wheeler marked the first 
time the Supreme Court differentiated between member and nonmember 
Indians—stating that tribes retain “attributes of sovereignty over both their 
members and their territory . . . .”70  
“While Wheeler provides a legal basis for the uncontroversial belief that 
tribes did not historically tip-toe around territorial borders in asserting their 
authority to enforce tribal laws,”71 the court found that “Duro offers the 
most direct support for membership-based jurisdiction.”72 The Duro case 
involved a member of the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission 
Indians who “allegedly shot and killed a 14-year-old boy within the Salt 
River [Pima-Maricopa Indian Community’s] Reservation boundaries.”73 In 
this critical decision, the Supreme Court held that an Indian tribe lacked the 
authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of other tribes 
regardless of whether the conduct occurred within its own territory.74  
In response to this decision, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights 
Act to indicate that the retained powers of Indian tribes include “the 
inherent power . . . to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”75 
Although the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the 
Tribe possessed the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers, the Court affirmed the notion that tribes do possess the power 
to prosecute members.76 The Court stated that “[r]etained criminal 
jurisdiction over members is accepted by our precedents and justified by the 
voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant right of 
participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on 
consent.”77  
In Kelsey, Judge McKeague noted that it is “[t]his consensual agreement 
between a tribe and its members [that] provides the core principle 
underpinning and justifying a membership-based jurisdiction that is not 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 323 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)). 
 71. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 856 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 72. Id. (citation omitted).  
 73. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 679, 679 (1990). 
 74. Id. 
 75. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). 
 76. Duro, 495 U.S. at 694. 
 77. Id. 
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rigidly tied to geographic qualifications.”78 Although neither Wheeler nor 
Duro expressly declared that tribes retain the inherent sovereign authority 
to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over tribal members, the court found 
that “their core principles strongly support the Band’s theory of 
jurisdiction.”79 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit answered the first of the three 
separate inquiries in the affirmative—Indian tribes have inherent sovereign 
authority to exercise extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction.80 
B. Since Tribes Have Inherent Sovereign Authority to Exercise Extra-
Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, Has That Authority Been “Expressly 
Limited by Congress or Treaty”? 
Addressing the second inquiry—whether Congress or treaties have 
expressly limited this inherent sovereign authority to exercise extra-
territorial criminal jurisdiction—the court found that neither Kelsey nor the 
Western District of Michigan “identified any treaty or statute that explicitly 
divests the Band of extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction.”81 Therefore, the 
second inquiry was answered in the negative; neither congressional action 
nor treaty has limited the Band’s inherent sovereign authority.82 
C. Have Tribes Been Implicitly Divested of the Power to Exercise 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by “Virtue of Their Domestic Dependent 
Status”? 
Turning to its third inquiry—whether Indian tribes’ status as domestic 
dependents implicitly divests them of the inherent sovereign authority to 
exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction—the court examined (1) “the history 
and breadth of implicit divestiture”83 and (2) “whether statutes extending 
federal jurisdiction into Indian country serve as a basis for implicitly 
divesting tribes of their jurisdiction over off-reservation offenses.”84  
Implicit divestiture is a judicially crafted theory that imposes additional 
limitations on tribal authority and “prohibits tribes from exercising various 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 856 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Kelsey v. 
Bailey, 137 S. Ct. 183 (2016). 
 79. Id. at 859. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 860. 
 84. Id. 
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types of civil legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction.”85 The Supreme 
Court created this theory in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,86 a case 
involving two non-Indians arrested and charged in tribal court for separate 
incidents occurring within the territory of the Suquamish Indians. “Oliphant 
thoroughly canvassed the history of treaties, statutes, and judicial decisions 
regarding crimes in Indian country and found a ‘commonly shared 
presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and lower federal courts 
that tribal courts do not have the power to try non-Indians.’”87  
Although Congress never explicitly divested Indian tribes of criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indian individuals for conduct within Indian Country, 
the Supreme Court found “that Congress consistently believed this to be the 
necessary result of its repeated legislative actions.”88 Weighing in on the 
subject, Judge McKeague stated that this belief was founded on Indian 
“tribes’ dependent status, identifying what [the Supreme Court] perceived 
to be an incongruous result should ‘Indian Tribes, although fully 
subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States, retain the power to try 
non-Indians according to [tribal] customs and procedure.’”89 The Supreme 
Court has consistently affirmed and extended this rationale in the years 
since Oliphant.90 However, the Court has also expressly stated that Indian 
tribes have not been divested of the inherent sovereign power to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over members for conduct that occurred within their 
territories.91 
Despite the Kelsey court finding that tribes have not been implicitly 
divested of the inherent sovereign power to charge and prosecute their 
members for on-reservation conduct, it found tribes’ “unique dependent 
status requires a more nuanced analysis in determining whether they may 
extend tribal prosecutions to members’ off-reservation conduct.”92 In 
undergoing this “nuanced analysis,” the court examined Montana v. United 
                                                                                                                 
 85. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 4.02(3)(a), at 226 (citing Sarah Krakoff, 
Tribal Civil Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for Judges, 81 COLO. L. REV. 
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 89. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 860 (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208-11). 
 90. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 
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States,93 which asked whether the Crow Tribe possessed the inherent power 
to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by non-Indian 
individuals on lands not owned by the Tribe but within its reservation 
boundaries.94 In deciding this issue, the Supreme Court “clarified [that] the 
extent of sovereign authority [was] implicitly divested as a result of the 
tribes’ dependent status.”95 The Montana Court declared that the “exercise 
of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government 
or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional 
delegation.”96 Accordingly, when examining if the Band’s exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction complied with Montana, the Kelsey court found it 
was “important to determine exactly what the Band [was] and [was] not 
arguing with respect to the scope of their jurisdictional power”97 in order to 
determine whether their asserted extra-territorial authority dealt with 
internal relations and self-governance.  
VI. Application and Ruling 
The Kelsey court found that the Band was aware “that a free-floating, 
membership-based jurisdiction over any criminal conduct”98 has the 
potential to conflict with Montana’s prescription that tribes’ limit criminal 
jurisdiction to “only that which is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-
government or control internal relations.’”99 Accordingly, the Band argued 
that Indian tribes possess a narrow, inherent extra-territorial power to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction for conduct occurring outside of Indian 
Country, “at least where the offenses substantially affect [a tribe’s] self-
governance interests.”100  
Agreeing with the Band, the court found that Kelsey’s conduct involved 
essential tribal government concerns and therefore substantially affected the 
Band’s “ability to control its self-governance.”101 Examining the specific 
conduct at issue, the court found the following: Kelsey was a board member 
of the Band’s legislative Tribal Council; Foster, Kelsey’s victim and 
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 94. Id. at 550-51. 
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member of a neighboring tribe, was an employee of the Little River Band of 
Ottawa Indians and was acting within the scope of her employment at an 
official meeting of the Tribal Council; and the incident “took place at the 
[Band’s] Community Center, the center of Tribal community activities ever 
since it was purchased.”102 The court held that “[t]his [was] no run-of-the-
mill criminal conduct, but conduct visited on the Band's employee by the 
Band's own elected official during an official tribal function: in pure form, 
this was an offense against the peace and dignity of the Band itself.”103 
While a broad scope of membership-based jurisdiction over any criminal 
conduct is certainly unharmonious with tribes’ status as dependent 
sovereigns, the court held that “the instant exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
[did] not fall within that category.”104 
Next, the court examined whether statutes extending federal jurisdiction 
into Indian Country should serve as a basis for implicitly divesting the Band 
of its jurisdiction over off-reservation offenses.105 Kelsey argued that 
several federal statutes, including the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act 
(“Non-Intercourse Act”),106 the Indian Country Crimes Act (“ICCA”),107 
and the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”),108 suggest Congress believes “that 
tribes have been implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction outside their 
territory.”109  
The Non-Intercourse Act was “[t]he first act of Congress that specifically 
defined substantive rights and duties in the field of Indian affairs.”110 The 
Act established, inter alia, federal regulation of trade with American 
Indians and “federal jurisdiction to enforce state criminal laws against non-
Indians who committed offenses against Indians in Indian country.”111 
Additionally, the ICCA declared that federal criminal jurisdiction to punish 
individuals for offenses shall extend into Indian Country except where the 
offense is “committed by one Indian against the person or property of 
another Indian.”112 The MCA further extended federal criminal jurisdiction 
over Indians by declaring that any Indian who commits any felony listed in 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the statute, such as murder or kidnapping, against any person within Indian 
Country, shall be under the federal government’s exclusive criminal 
jurisdiction.113 The court found, however, that these statutes failed to 
address “a tribe’s authority over member conduct outside the 
reservation.”114  
While the district court declared that Congress believes tribes have been 
implicitly divested of their jurisdiction over off-reservation offenses due to 
lack of statutes discussing this type of concurrent criminal jurisdiction, the 
Kelsey court disagreed.115 The Sixth Circuit found that this “legislative 
void” does not demonstrate “[c]ongressional intent to limit tribal criminal 
jurisdiction to Indian country” for three reasons.116 First, the court began by 
considering the findings in United States v. Wheeler.117 In this case, the 
Supreme Court examined the Non-Intercourse Act and the ICCA and found 
the two statutes “to be examples of general limitations on tribal criminal 
jurisdiction that do not limit tribal authority over members.”118 The Kelsey 
court upheld and followed this finding.119 In fact, in discussing the two 
statutes, the Court in Wheeler expressly stated that “far from depriving 
Indian tribes of their sovereign power to punish offenses against tribal law 
by members of a tribe, Congress has repeatedly recognized that power and 
declined to disturb it.”120  
Second, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court incorrectly found 
that the lack of statutes addressing concurrent criminal jurisdiction for 
conduct occurring outside of Indian Country demonstrates congressional 
intent to limit tribal criminal jurisdiction to Indian Country. The Sixth 
Circuit found that this approach conflicts with the holdings of Iowa Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. LaPlante121 and Helvering v. Hallock.122 In LaPlante, an 
insurance company brought suit in federal court against members of the 
Blackfeet Indian Tribe seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or 
indemnify its insured after an employee of the insured sought compensation 
from involvement in a motor vehicle accident.123 The Supreme Court held 
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that because Indian tribes retain “all inherent attributes of sovereignty that 
have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference 
from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains intact.”124 In 
Helvering, the Supreme Court examined “whether transfers of property 
inter vivos made in trust . . . [were] within the provisions of [section] 302(c) 
of the Revenue Act of 1926.”125 Here, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
notion that congressional silence meant inherent sovereign authority 
remained.126 
Third, the court held that congressional silence on whether tribal criminal 
jurisdiction could possibly extend outside of Indian Country must not be 
viewed as an implicit divestiture of tribes’ inherent sovereign powers.127 
Although the district court stated that “[i]t is inconceivable that Congress 
overlooked such an anomaly, regulating tribal jurisdiction [in] Indian 
country closely for these past two centuries, while leaving the tribes free to 
assert criminal jurisdiction outside Indian Country,”128 the Sixth Circuit 
disagreed. Citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, in which the 
Supreme Court examined “whether tribal sovereign immunity bars [the 
State of] Michigan's suit against the Bay Mills Indian Community for 
opening a casino outside Indian lands,”129 the court here found that it should 
not assume that Congress sought to undermine tribal self-governance.130 
Rather, Congress created criminal jurisdiction within Indian Country to 
bestow “criminal justice where tribal powers were presumed absent or 
inadequate.”131 Accordingly, “[g]iven the baseline assumption that, ‘until 
Congress acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority,’”132 the 
court held that courts must respect Congress’s function of elucidating the 
retained sovereign powers of Indian tribes.133 Additionally, in the absence 
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of a legislative framework, tribes retain all inherent sovereign powers not 
divested.134 
For the reasons explained above, the court held that since Kelsey’s 
conduct involved essential tribal government concerns substantially 
affecting the Band’s “ability to control its self-governance,”135 the Band 
continues to possess the inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over Kelsey’s conduct, despite it occurring outside of Indian 
Country. Therefore, the court “reverse[d] the district court’s grant of habeas 
relief for lack of tribal jurisdiction.”136  
Lastly, the Sixth Circuit examined whether the tribal court of appeals 
judgment violated Kelsey’s due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights 
Act (ICRA).137 Because “[t]he Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment do not of their own force apply to Indian tribes,”138 the court 
found that ICRA was the only source of due process relief for Kelsey.139 
ICRA provides that no Indian tribe may “deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty 
or property without due process of law.”140 Kelsey’s conduct involved 
essential tribal government concerns that substantially affected the Band’s 
self-governance. Conclusively, it was within tribal jurisdiction, and thus the 
court found that Kelsey was protected.141  
Kelsey argued that his due process protections were violated when the 
tribal court of appeals “[struck] down a territorial limitation on the Band's 
jurisdiction in one of the Tribal criminal ordinances and ‘retroactively 
expand[ed] the geographic reach’ of criminal jurisdiction over his off-
reservation conduct.”142 At the time of the incident, section 4.03(a) of the 
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians’ Criminal Offenses Ordinance 
provided that criminal jurisdiction shall extend to “[1] all land within the 
limits of the Tribe's reservation . . . [,] [2] [land] held in trust by the United 
States . . . [,] and [3] land considered ‘Indian country.’”143 Section 4.03(b) 
provided that criminal jurisdiction could be exercised over a tribal member 
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if he or she committed any one of nine enumerated offenses, no matter 
where the conduct occurred.144 “Sexual assault was not one of the 
enumerated offenses.”145 Consequently, Kelsey claimed that the tribal 
courts lacked criminal jurisdiction to charge and convict him.146 However, 
the tribal court of appeals found—and the Sixth Circuit agreed—that the 
Offenses Ordinance conflicted with both the Band’s constitution and 
section 8.08 of the Band’s Criminal Procedure Ordinance.147  
The tribal court of appeals held that the Offenses Ordinance, which 
Kelsey relied upon, was unconstitutional.148 Article I of the Band’s 
constitution provides that “[t]he territory of the Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians shall encompass all lands which are now or hereinafter owned by or 
reserved for the Tribe”149 and that “[t]he Tribe’s jurisdiction over its 
members and territory shall be exercised to the fullest extent consistent with 
this Constitution, the sovereign powers of the Tribe, and federal law.”150 
Thus, Article I of the Band’s constitution “required extending jurisdiction 
over tribal members and also to tribally-owned land (like the Community 
Center) ‘to the fullest extent’ permissible under tribal and federal law.”151 
Further, section 8.08 of the Band’s Criminal Procedure Ordinance declares 
that “[t]he Tribal Court shall have jurisdiction over any action by any 
Indian as defined by this ordinance, that is made a criminal offense under 
[the] applicable Tribal Code and that occurred within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Tribe as defined in the Constitution.”152 The Sixth Circuit 
held that, rather than retroactively expanding the geographic reach of 
criminal jurisdiction as Kelsey alleged, the tribal court of appeals removed 
the “dissonant territorial limitation” in order “[t]o harmonize the Offenses 
Ordinance with the Tribal Constitution.”153 Therefore, since both the 
Band’s constitution and section 8.08 of the Band’s Criminal Procedure 
Ordinance “provided warning that criminal jurisdiction would extend to 
Kelsey's conduct by virtue of either Tribal ownership of the Community 
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Center or Kelsey's tribal membership,” the Sixth Circuit held that Kelsey 
was not denied fair notice.154 
VII. The Significance of the Court’s Holding 
The Sixth Circuit’s holding is an emphatic victory for Indian tribes 
because it is the first federal judicial decision to recognize a tribe’s power 
to extend criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian Country. The District Court 
for the Western District of Michigan inferred that the lack of federal 
statutes addressing concurrent criminal jurisdiction for conduct occurring 
outside of Indian Country demonstrated congressional intent to implicitly 
divest tribes of their power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over off-
reservation offenses. In stark contrast, the Sixth Circuit found that unless 
Congress has expressly divested tribes of such powers, they are maintained.  
Not only did the Sixth Circuit endorse the inherent sovereign authority of 
tribes, but the court’s holding affirmed that Indian tribes have the power to 
enforce membership-based criminal jurisdiction, independent of the already 
established territorial-based jurisdiction. However, it is important to note 
that the Sixth Circuit’s holding does not grant tribes the power to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over tribal members for any conduct occurring outside 
of Indian Country. Rather, the court recognized that a “free-floating, 
membership-based jurisdiction” over any criminal conduct has the potential 
to create significant problems with Montana’s holding. Using the Montana 
rule to determine whether a tribe has overstepped their jurisdictional 
authority, the court correctly established a narrow precedent that must be 
read in light of the unique facts. Under this rule from the Sixth Circuit, in 
order for a tribe to enforce its criminal jurisdictional authority over conduct 
occurring off-reservation, the exercise of such power must be necessary to 
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations. 
Here, the interests of the Band to protect the tribe’s self-governance and 
to control internal relations were overwhelmingly obvious. This case 
involved one of nine elected officials of the Band’s Tribal Council, Kelsey, 
who was acting as an agent of the Tribe when the incident occurred. Foster, 
the other actor, was a tribal employee. Although the incident occurred 
outside of Indian Country, both Kelsey and Foster were attending a tribal 
activity at a tribally-owned community center. Further, the Sixth Circuit 
noted that “[i]t also involve[d] a Tribal Court finding that [Kelsey] 
exercised political influence affecting the victim and the Tribe's welfare.”155  
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The United States Supreme Court’s denial of Kelsey’s petition for writ 
of certiorari on October 3, 2016,156 solidifies the Sixth Circuit’s rule that 
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign powers not expressly divested by 
Congress. Accordingly, tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
members for conduct occurring outside of Indian Country if it is necessary 
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations. However, 
many questions regarding the breadth of such powers remain unanswered. 
One such example focuses on whether a tribe can exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over a tribal member for illegal conduct occurring outside of 
Indian Country and on property not owned by the tribe. Regardless of the 
answers to these lingering questions, the Sixth Circuit’s holding remains a 
momentous triumph for Indian tribes.  
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